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The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)1 
continues to be an active area of litigation,2 starting with the 
cornerstone mechanism of the “impartial due process hearing.”3  
More specifically, the IDEA requires each state to have either a one-
tier system conducted by impartial hearing officers (IHOs) or a two-
tier system, which adds an impartial review officer level.4  In the 
approximately thirty-five years since the passage of the original 
version of this funding statute for special education, the gradual trend 
has been for a one-tier system composed of full-time IHOs, often 
within a state office of administrative law judges.5 
                                                          
* Perry A. Zirkel is university professor of education and law at Lehigh 
University.  He has a Ph.D. in Education Administration, a J.D. from the University 
of Connecticut, and an LL.M. from Yale. 
 
1 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400.1 et seq. (West 2012).  For the corresponding 
regulations, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.1 et seq. (2012). 
2 Special education is the major growth segment within K-12 education 
litigation.  See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Brent L. Johnson, The “Explosion” in 
Education Litigation: An Update, 265 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2011).  The IDEA 
expressly conditions the right to judicial review on exhaustion of the state’s 
administrative adjudication process.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2006).  The courts 
have rather extensively applied this exhaustion provision.  See, e.g., Lewis 
Wasserman, Delineating Administrative Exhaustion Requirements and Establishing 
Courts’ Jurisdiction Requirements under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, 29 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 349 (2009).  As a result, 
IDEA court decisions are only the upper part of an iceberg that has a broad base of 
hearing officer decisions at the base.  For an empirical examination of this case law 
conception, see Perry A. Zirkel & Amanda Machin, The Special Education Case 
Law “Iceberg”: An Initial Exploration of the Underside, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 483 
(2012). 
3 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (2012).  Approximately 
eight states account for eighty percent of the adjudicated hearings.  See, e.g., Perry 
A. Zirkel & Karen Gischlar, Due Process Hearings under the IDEA: A 
Longitudinal Frequency Analysis, 21 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 22, 28 (2008). 
4 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.514 (2012). 
5 Perry A. Zirkel & Gina Scala, Due Process Hearing Systems under the 
IDEA: A State-by-State Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 3 (2010).  Currently, 
approximately forty-one states have a one-tier system, and thirty-three states have 
full-time IHOs.  Id. at 5.  For the larger trend of legalization of this process, see 
Perry A. Zirkel, Zorka Karanxha, & Anastasia D’Angelo, Creeping Judicialization 
of Special Education Hearings: An Exploratory Study, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. 
L. JUDICIARY 27 (2007). 
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The jurisdiction of the IHOs includes the successive issues of 
eligibility, which the IDEA refers to under the overlapping terms of 
“identification, evaluation, or entitlement,” which the IDEA refers to 
as “placement” and “the provision of free appropriate public 
education” (FAPE).6  Overlapping with FAPE and documented in an 
individualized educational program (IEP),7 the placement must be in 
the least restrictive environment (LRE).8  The vast majority of cases 
concern FAPE,9 with the primary remedies for denial of FAPE being 
tuition reimbursement and compensatory education.10 
The purpose of this brief article is to provide pointers for IHOs 
that facilitate defensible decisions in FAPE cases, which account for 
the bulk of their IDEA workload.11  In light of the variance from state 
to state under the “cooperative federalism” structure of the IDEA,12 
the article uses New York, the leading state for IDEA hearings,13 as 
its example for jurisdictional customization.  Thus, the cited basis 
consists of the statutory and regulatory provisions and the case law 
under not only the IDEA but also New York.14  Although the case 
                                                          
6 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a) (2012). 
7 20 U.S.C. § 1402(14) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.22 (2012). 
8 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2006); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.114–300.120 (2012). 
9 See, e.g., PERRY A. ZIRKEL, Case Law under the IDEA, in IDEA: A HANDY 
DESK REFERENCE TO THE LAW, REGULATIONS AND INDICATORS (LexisNexis Pub., 
2012). 
10 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review 
Officers under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: An Update, 31 J. 
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2011).   
11 For more general guidance, see generally PERRY A. ZIRKEL, IMPARTIAL 
HEARINGS UNDER THE IDEA: LEGAL ISSUES AND ANSWERS (2013), available at 
http://www.nasdse.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=nTeBfmZi_Aw%3D&tabid=36. 
12 See, e.g., Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 733–34 
(2d Cir. 2007); Evans v. Evans, 818 F. Supp. 1215, 1223 (N.D. Ind. 1993). 
13 See, e.g., Zirkel & Gischlar, supra note 3, at 27–28.  This accounting of 
adjudicated IDEA hearings does not include the District of Columbia, which has 
not only a special status but also the highest volume of such hearings.  Id.  
14 New York’s relevant special education legislation and regulations are 
included to the illustrative extent, in pertinent part, they add to the federal 
requirements.  For a more comprehensive comparison, see generally NEW YORK 
STATE EDUC. DEP’T, NEW YORK STATE LAW, REGULATIONS AND POLICY NOT 
REQUIRED BY FEDERAL LAW/REGULATION/POLICY (2012), available at 
http://www.p12.nysed.gov/specialed/idea/608analysischart-May2012.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
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law emphasis is on published court decisions of the Second Circuit 
and New York federal district courts, unpublished court decisions 
from these courts and judicial rulings from other jurisdictions are 
added to fill in the gaps.15    
The article consists of three successive parts.  The first part 
provides observations and recommendations concerning the 
prevailing norms for the legal defensibility of the IHO’s written 
decision.  The second part addresses the FAPE standards in terms of 
a three-step framework for decision-making.  The final part 
canvasses the primary remedies—tuition reimbursement and 
compensatory education—other than prospective injunctive relief. 
 
I. THE DECISIONAL NORMS 
Corresponding to the similar posture of various other 
jurisdictions,16 the Second Circuit accords deference to the IHO 
where the written opinion is “thorough and careful.”17  Thus, the 
                                                          
15 Additionally, because New York is a two-tier state, a sampling of New 
York’s state review officer (SRO) decisions are included as additional gap-filling 
illustrations. 
16 See, e.g., J.W. ex rel. J.E.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431 (9th 
Cir. 2010); Doyle v. Arlington Cnty. Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1991); 
Kerkam v. Superintendent, D.C. Pub. Sch., 931 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  
17 See, e.g., Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 196 (2d Cir. 
2005); Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 1998); 
see also M.H v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 244 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“Determinations grounded in thorough and logical reasoning should be provided 
more deference than decisions that are not.”).  Within this overall standard, the 
Second Circuit has established that substantive and methodology determinations 
are entitled to more judicial deference that procedural and non-methodology 
determinations.  M.H v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 244, 246 (2d Cir. 
2012).  Although in a two-tier state, such as New York, the SRO level receives 
primary judicial deference, the local IHO shares this deference, especially but not 
exclusively in methodology cases.  See, e.g., T.Y. ex rel. T.Y. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of 
Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 419 (2d Cir. 2009); Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 
F.3d 377, 383 (2d Cir. 2003); cf. Woods v. Northport Pub. Sch., 487 F. App’x 968 
(6th Cir. 2012) (deference to IHO rather than district personnel where the two 
levels conflict).  Moreover, in cases where the IHO meets the norm and the SRO 
does not, the IHO is entitled to presumptive correctness.  See, e.g., M.H v. N.Y.C. 
Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 246, 248–49 (2d Cir. 2012); Doyle v. Arlington 
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 953 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1991).  In the latest iteration of this 
issue, the Second Circuit declared: “a court must defer to the SRO's decision on 
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following recommendations are offered as prophylactic guidance for 
IHOs in writing their decisions:  
1)  Use a clear and concise statement of the issues as the 
organizing framework.18 
2)  Provide specific support cited from the record19 for each of 
your factual findings.20   
                                                          
matters requiring educational expertise unless it concludes that the decision was 
inadequately reasoned, in which case a better-reasoned IHO opinion may be 
considered instead.”  R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 189 (2d Cir. 
2012).  Finally, although the focus for such deference is the IHO’s written opinion, 
the Ninth Circuit extended the “thorough and careful” to the IHO’s participation in 
the questioning of witnesses.  R.B. ex rel. F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 
496 F.3d 932, 942 (9th Cir. 2007). 
18 See, e.g., Options Pub. Charter Sch. v. Howe, 512 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57 
(D.D.C. 2007) (finding the IHO’s ambiguous statement of the issues as one of the 
sources for a remand); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF 
STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 09-002 (2009) (affirmed IHO’s decision based 
in part on clearly identified issues).  In setting forth the issues, the IHO may re-
state the version of either or both parties within reasonable limits.  See, e.g., J.W. ex 
rel. J.E.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 2010); Ford v. 
Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2002); M.M. v. Lafayette 
School District, 58 IDELR ¶ 132 (N.D. Cal. 2012); K.E. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 
15, 54 IDELR ¶ 215 (D. Minn. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 647 F.3d 795 (8th 
Cir. 2011).  However, the IHO may not expand the scope of the issues sua sponte.  
See, e.g., Student with a Disability, 59 IDELR ¶ 150 (N.Y. SRO 2012). 
19 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8 § 200.5(j)(5)(v) (“The decision shall 
reference the hearing record to support the findings of fact”).  Courts’ deference to 
IHOs’ factual findings in IDEA cases is subject to general norms for decision-
making.  See, e.g., D.B. v. Craven Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 32 IDELR ¶ 86 (4th Cir. 
2000); Doyle v. Arlington Cnty. Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100 (4th
 
Cir. 1991).  Thus, 
deference is strengthened by or conditioned on such cited support.  See, e.g., 
Ravenswood City Sch. Dist. v. J.S., 870 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(deference based on thorough and careful factual findings, including that IHO 
discussed qualifications of witnesses on which she chose to rely).  Conversely, 
courts tend to overturn decisions without such careful support.  Compare S.G. v. 
Dist. of Columbia, 498 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D.D.C. 2007) (arbitrary and capricious), 
and R.S. v. Montgomery Twp. Bd. of Educ., 59 IDELR ¶ 47 (D.N.J. 2012) 
(contrary to preponderant proof), and Stanton v. Dist. of Columbia, 680 F. Supp. 
2d 201 (D.D.C. 2010) (failure to include sufficient findings and reasoning for 
calculation of compensatory education), and Options Pub. Charter Sch. v. Howe, 
512 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2007) (entire lack of factual findings nullified IHO’s 
decision), and Blount v. Lancaster-Lebanon Intermediate Unit, 40 IDELR ¶ 62 
(M.D. Pa. 2003) (fatal lack of “express, qualitative determinations regarding the 
relative credibility and persuasiveness of the witnesses”), with J.P. v. Cnty. Sch. 
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•  Here is an example that a federal court provided in 
concluding the IHO fell fatally short of this expectation:  
“[T]he hearing officer refers to ‘[t]he credible testimony 
of Paris Adon’ and the ‘compelling[,]’ ‘logical and 
credible’ testimony of ‘Dr. [Cranford][,]’ [sic], but makes 
no findings with respect to the basis upon which she 
credited their testimony.”21 
a) Just as courts defer to IHOs based on presumed expertise 
and direct observation,22 in assessing the weight of 
testimony the courts consider the witness’s qualifications 
regarding the issue and familiarity with the child.23  
b) In arriving at factual findings in a FAPE case, do not rely on 
testimony that supports modifications materially different 
from the contents of the IEP: “a deficient IEP may not be 
effectively rehabilitated or amended after the fact through 
                                                          
Bd., 516 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 2008) (credibility-based determinations need not be 
detailed in light of the 45-day deadline).  For examples at the SRO level, see NEW 
YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION 
NO. 10-007, at 19 (2010) (overturning the IHO's decision, noting that “the [IHO’s] 
1 1/2 page decision is devoid of any specific cites to transcript pages, exhibit 
numbers, or to any legal authority”); see also NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION 
DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 10-086, at 7 (2010); 
NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO 
DECISION NO.  08-064, at 5 n.7 (2008).  For the SRO’s deferential review standard 
for factual findings, see, e.g., NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE 
OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 11-146, at 12 (2011) (including Third 
Circuit’s approach in Carlisle for credibility-based findings). 
20 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a) (2012); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8 § 
200.5(j)(4)(i). 
21 Options Pub. Charter Sch., 512 F. Supp. 2d at 57. 
22 See, e.g., M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 244 (2d Cir. 2012); 
Woods v. Northport Pub. Sch., 487 F. App’x 968, 973–74 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(expertise); D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 554 (3d Cir. 2010); Doyle 
v. Arlington Cnty. Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1991) (observation). 
23 See, e.g., Marshall Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. C.D., 616 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 
2010); cf. Sebastian M. v. King Phillip Reg’l Sch. Dist., 685 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(due deference to IHO valuation of expert testimony).  These same two factors 
apply to the parents’ witnesses; exclusive or arbitrary deference to the school 
personnel is contrary to the adjudicative mechanism of the IDEA and, thus, is a 
possible basis for reversal.  See, e.g., K.S. ex rel. P.S. v. Fremont Unified Sch. 
Dist., 679 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 426 F. App’x 536 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
    
248 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 33-1 
testimony regarding services that do not appear in the 
IEP.”24 
3)  Similarly, legal conclusions should cite specific support in 
terms of the legal standards and their clear application to the 
pertinent factual findings.25 
• For example, the same federal district court that identified 
the aforementioned26 defective factual findings cited the 
IHO’s legal conclusions as fatally erroneous:  
- “it is entirely conceivable . . . that the mother's 
participation in the IEP meetings should have alerted . . . 
[the school district] that more comprehensive 
evaluations were warranted[.]”27 
- “it is most probable that the provision of a FAPE to 
this Petitioner might have required . . . [the district] . . . 
to file a due process hearing complaint once the mother 
insisted on a change of special education instruction 
hours.”28  
4) As a general matter, but particularly in close cases, it is good 
practice to make clear which party had the burden of 
persuasion.29   
• The Supreme Court interpreted the IDEA as putting the 
burden of persuasion on the party raising the issue of 
                                                          
24 R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 185 (2d Cir. 2012). 
25 See, e.g., Marc M. v. Dep’t of Educ., 762 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Haw. 2011); 
Joshua A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 49 IDELR ¶ 249 (E.D. Cal. 2008); 
Arlington Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Smith, 230 F. Supp. 2d 704 (E.D. Va. 2002); cf. N.Y. 
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8 § 200.5(j)(5)(v) (“[The IHO’s decision] shall set 
forth the reasons and the factual basis for the determination.”).  But cf. S.A. v. 
Weast, No. 8:11–cv–01137–AW, 2012 WL 4480549 (D. Md. Sept. 26, 2012) 
(deference).  The SRO applies an “independent” standard of review for the IHO’s 
legal conclusions.  See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE 
OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 11-45, at 16 (July 25, 2011).  Citing this 
same “independent” phraseology in the IDEA (20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(2) (2006), 
courts have characterized this standard as “de novo.”  See, e.g., M.W. v. N.Y.C. 
Dep’t of Educ., 869 F. Supp. 2d 320, 329 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
26 See Options Pub. Charter Sch., 512 F. Supp. 2d at 57. 
27 Id. (quotation marks omitted).  
28 Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
29 See, e.g., Blount v. Lancaster-Lebanon Intermediate Unit, 40 IDELR ¶ 62 
(E.D. Pa. 2003). 
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FAPE, which is usually the parent.30  However, the Court 
sidestepped the issue of state laws that expressly address 
this issue.31 
• In New York, the burden of proof—both in terms of 
production and persuasion—is on the district according to 
legislation that went into effect on Oct. 14, 2007.32 
                                                          
30 Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005).  Lower courts in 
some jurisdictions have extended this burden to other IDEA issues.  See, e.g., L.E. 
v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2006) (LRE); Antoine M. v. Chester 
Upland Sch. Dist., 420 F. Supp. 2d 396 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (eligibility). 
31 More specifically, the Court commented: 
 
[R]espondents and several States urge us to decide 
that States may, if they wish, override the default 
rule and put the burden always on the school 
district.  Several States have laws or regulations 
purporting to do so, at least under some 
circumstances.  See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 125A.091, 
subd. 16 (2004); Ala. Admin. Code Rule 290-8-9-
.08(8)(c)(6) (Supp.2004); Alaska Admin. Code, tit. 
4, § 52.550(e)(9) (2003); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 14, § 
3140 (1999). Because no such law or regulation 
exists in Maryland [i.e., the state of this litigation], 
we need not decide this issue. 
 
Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 61. 
32 The legislation provides an express exception for the appropriateness of the 
parent’s unilateral placement in a tuition reimbursement case.  N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 
4404(1)(c) (McKinney 2013).  For recognition of this change as of October 14, 
2007, see J.G. ex rel. N.G. v. Kiryas Joel Union Free Sch. Dist., 777 F. Supp. 2d 
606, 641 n.29 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  In cases arising in the interim between Schaffer 
and the effective date of the New York law, the Second Circuit placed the burden 
of persuasion on the parent for both the appropriateness of the district’s and the 
parent’s unilateral placement.  T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 
247, 252 (2d Cir. 2009); Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 112 
(2d Cir. 2007).  A recent federal district court decision placed the burden of 
persuasion on the parents, but the court apparently missed the New York law, (only 
citing Schaffer and these interim Second Circuit decisions) and the ruling amounted 
to dicta (because the court concluded that “were the burden placed on the [district], 
the outcome of the instant case would remain the same”).  M.W. ex rel. S.W. v. 
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 869 F. Supp. 2d 320, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  In its most 
recent opinion, the Second Circuit acknowledged but declined to address the issue, 
observing the burden of persuasion only applies when the evidence is in equipoise.  
M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 225 n.3 (2d Cir. 2012); cf. NEW 
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5) Add any prefatory and closing material that state law requires 
or efficient practice warrants. 
• For example, in New York the applicable regulations 
require including “a statement advising the parents and 
the board of education of the right of any party involved 
in the hearing to obtain a review of such a decision by the 
State review officer.”33 
 
II.   FAPE STANDARDS 
For FAPE cases, here is an illustrative, three-step framework that 
facilitates a thorough and careful analysis:34 
1) What are the individual needs of this particular eligible 
child?35 
                                                          
YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION 
NO. 12-025, at 13 n.8 (2012) (noting that the evidence favored the party that 
prevailed rather than being in equipoise, thus rendering alleged misapplication of 
the burden of persuasion harmless); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, 
OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 10-033, at 32 (2010); NEW YORK 
STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 
09-057, at 19 (2009) (noting that the evidence showed that the district failed to 
offer a FAPE regardless of which party bore the burden of proof); NEW YORK 
STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 
08-015, at 11 (2008) (noting conflicting statements in the IHO decision regarding 
which party bore the burden of persuasion).  For burden of proof under in IDEA 
hearings more generally, see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Who Has the Burden of 
Persuasion in Impartial Hearings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act? CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. (forthcoming). 
33 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8 § 200.5(j)(5)(v).  For examples, see 
NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO 
DECISION NO. 09-096 (2009); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE 
OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 07-011 (2007); NEW YORK STATE 
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 03-086 
(2003).  For a related issue intersecting with the IDEA’s finality requirement, see 
NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO 
DECISION NO. 07-128 (2007) (overturning IHO “supplemental” decision after the 
final one, granting two thirty-day extensions to allow extra time for filing a petition 
with the SRO).    
34 Although its component steps are based on pertinent regulations and case 
law, the overall framework is merely one logical way of determining FAPE rather 
than being judicially created or mandated. 
35 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(b)(3)(B), 1414(b)(4), 1414(d)(1)(A) (2006); see 
also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.304(c)(4) (evaluation “in all areas related to the suspected 
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2) Is the IEP substantively tailored to meet this child’s needs?36 
a) More specifically, the standard is whether the IEP is 
“reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive 
educational benefits.”37  In the Second Circuit, the key 
questions to be answered based on “objective evidence”38 
are as follows: 
•  Is the IEP “likely to produce progress, not regression”?  
    – and – 
                                                          
disability”), 300.301(c)(2)(ii) (evaluation to determine child’s individual needs), 
300.320(a)(1) (IEP statement of child’s “present levels academic achievement and 
functional performance”), and 300.320 (a)(2)(i)(B) (IEP statement of measurable 
annual goals to “meet each of the child’s . . . needs that result from the child’s 
disability”).  Although these various IDEA requirements may be regarded as 
procedural, they inevitably merge with the substantive standard for FAPE.  See 
infra note 36 and accompanying text.  For examples of denials of FAPE based on 
this threshold standard, see N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d 1202 
(9th Cir. 2008) (failure to evaluate child with speech impairment for reasonably 
suspected autism); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE 
REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 12-027, at 13–15 (2012) (noting the district's failure to 
sufficiently identify the child's speech-language deficits); NEW YORK STATE 
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 11-142, 
at 21–25 (2011); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE 
REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO.  11-041, at 12–14 (2011); NEW YORK STATE 
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 10-101, 
at 10–11 (2010). 
36 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 (1982) (“The [FAPE] 
required by the Act is tailored to the unique needs of the child [with a disability] by 
means of an [IEP]”); see also id. at 188–89 (“educational instruction specially 
designed to meet the unique needs for the child [with a disability]”); NEW YORK 
STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 
10-050, at 14–15 (2010). 
37 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207. 
38 “Objective evidence” for a mainstreamed child includes “passing grades and 
regular advancement.”  Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 
130 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207 n.28).  However, this evidence 
does not per se amount to FAPE.  See, e.g., M.S. v. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 96 (2d 
Cir. 2000).  More generally, objective evidence includes grades and test scores.  
See, e.g., E.W.K. ex rel. B.K. v. Bd. of Educ., 884 F. Supp. 2d 39 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); 
M.H. v. Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., 296 F. App’x 126, 128 (2d Cir. 2008); 
Grim v. Rhinebeck, Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 383 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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• Does the IEP provide the student with an opportunity 
greater than mere “trivial advancement?”39 
b)  The IEP melds the program and the placement, which refers 
to “the general educational program in which the 
handicapped child is placed.”40 
c) Thus, LRE may well be an integral part of the substantive 
FAPE analysis, triggering identification and application of 
the applicable test.41 
                                                          
39 E.S. ex rel. B.S. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Sch. Dist., 487 F. App’x 619, 621 
(2d Cir. 2012); T.P. ex rel. S.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 
247, 254 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 
195 (2d Cir. 2005)); Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195 (citing Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130); 
NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO 
DECISION NO. 08-038 (2008); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE 
OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 06-044 (2006) (finding that the child's IEP 
was likely to produce progress that was more than trivial). 
40 Concerned Parents v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d 751, 756 (2d Cir. 
1980).  Citing Concerned Parents, the Second Circuit more recently explained that 
educational placement under the IDEA is “the general educational program—such 
as the classes, individualized attention and additional services a child will 
receive—rather than the ‘bricks and mortar’ of the specific school.”  T.Y. ex rel. 
T.Y. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 419 (2d Cir. 2009); NEW YORK 
STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 
10-070, at 13–15 (2010); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF 
STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 07-049, at 10 (2007).  Nevertheless, the site 
may well be relevant; the determination of whether the district’s placement or, in 
tuition reimbursement cases at the second appropriateness prong, the parent’s 
unilateral placement amounts to FAPE is often in the context of a particular school.  
See, e.g., E.S. ex rel. B.S. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Sch. Dist., 742 F. Supp. 2d 417 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 487 F. App’x 619 (2d Cir. 2012).  For the related issue of 
identifying the service provider on the IEP, see Questions and Answers on 
Individualized Education Program (IEP) Development, The State’s Model IEP 
Form and Related Documents, NYSED, 
http://www.p12.nysed.gov/specialed/formsnotices/IEP/training/answers-
placement.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2013) (look at question and answer four). 
41 See, e.g., P. ex rel. Mr. and Mrs. P v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111 
(2d Cir. 2008) (citing Oberti v. Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 
1993)); see also K.L.A. v. Windham Se. Supervisory Unit, 371 F. App’x 151 (2d 
Cir. 2010).  For lower court applications of this test, see, e.g., G.B. v. Tuxedo 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 751 F. Supp. 2d 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); J.S. v. North Colonie 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 586 F. Supp. 2d 74 (N.D.N.Y. 2008); Patskin v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Webster Cent. Sch. Dist., 583 F. Supp. 2d 422 (W.D.N.Y. 2008).  As clarified in 
NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO 
DECISION NO. 11-143 (2011), LRE refers to access to nondisabled peers, typically 
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d) The Second Circuit recently joined the majority of other 
circuits in adopting the “snapshot” approach to determining 
substantive appropriateness, adding the exception of 
amendments made during the resolution period.42   
e) In any event, the substantive standard is clearly not whether 
the district’s IEP is best43 or, in tuition reimbursement 
cases, whether it is better than the parent’s unilateral 
placement.44 
3) Did the district violate one or more of the various applicable 
procedural requirements of the IDEA?45 
a) If so, was the violation the failure to “significantly impede[] 
the parent’s opportunity to participate in the decision-
making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the 
parents’ child?”46 
                                                          
but not exclusively in general education, not to teacher-to-student ratios in special 
education. 
42 R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012).  For the 
position of the other circuits, see Perry A. Zirkel, The “Snapshot” Standard under 
the IDEA, 269 EDUC. L. REP. 455 (2011). 
43 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 197 n.21 (1982); Cerra, 
427 F.3d at 195; J.G. ex rel. N.G. v. Kiryas-Joel Union Free Sch. Dist., 777 F. 
Supp. 2d 606, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
44 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Squillacote, 935 F.2d 303, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1991).   
45 The IDEA prescribes detailed procedures for evaluations, including parental 
consent (20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)-(c) (2006); individualized education programs (id. § 
1414(d), and various safeguards, including notices and the IHO process (id. § 
1415)).  In its landmark, FAPE decision, the Supreme Court recognized the 
procedural emphasis in the structure of the IDEA, concluding that “adequate 
compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not 
all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP.”  Rowley, 
458 U.S. at 206. 
46 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2)(ii) (2012).  
In general, the courts have not focused on this statutory language and have been 
slow in accepting its violation as a per se denial of FAPE.  Compare L.M. v. 
Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 90 (2009) (prevailing two-step approach), with J.T. v. Dep’t of Educ., 59 
IDELR ¶ 4 (D. Haw. 2012); Bd. of Educ. v. Schaefer, 923 N.Y.S.2d 579 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2011) (finding per se denial).  Similarly, the SRO decisions have 
addressed this procedural violation on an ad hoc, not per se, basis.  See, e.g., NEW 
YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION 
NO. 12-055, at 13–14 (2012); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE 
OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 12-048, at 7–8 (2012); NEW YORK STATE 
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b) For other violations, was the result a loss of educational 
benefit?47 
• Incorporated state law standards48 are included in this 
two-step analysis,49
 
but with differentiated weight 
between functional behavioral assessments (serious 
violations requiring special scrutiny at the benefit step) 
and parent counseling/training (rarely, if absent alone, 
amounting to the requisite loss).50 
•  For example, a district’s failure to specify the school site 
in the IEP is not, in relation to the IDEA’s procedural 
requirement for the IEP to specify the “location” for the 
services,51 a per se denial of FAPE.52 
                                                          
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 11-100, 
at 18–19 (2011); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE 
REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 11-031, at 11–12 (2011); NEW YORK STATE 
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 10-070, 
at 12–13 (2010). 
47 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i), (iii) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2)(i), (iii) 
(2012).  For recent illustrative applications, compare A.H. ex rel. J.H. v. Dep’t of 
Educ., 394 F. App’x 718 (2d Cir. 2010); T.P. ex rel. S.P. v. Mamaroneck Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding no), with R.E. v. N.Y.C. 
Dep’t of Educ., 785 F. Supp. 2d 28 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding yes).  For examples 
applying this two-step test at the second tier, see NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION 
DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 12-013, at 14 (2012); 
NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO 
DECISION NO. 09-080, at 5–6 (2009); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, 
OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 07-030, at 14 (2007). 
48 See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8 § 200.1(ww)(3)(i) (four areas 
of individual need); id. § 200.3(a)(1)(iv), (vii), (viii) (additional members of IEP 
team); id. § 200.4(b)(v) (functional behavioral assessment).  See, e.g., NEW YORK 
STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 
11-049, at 13–15 (2011) (concluding that failure to follow multiple state 
procedures, including consideration of a functional behavioral assessment resulted 
in a denial of a FAPE). 
49 See, e.g., A.C. ex rel. M.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 
2009); M.W. ex rel. S.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 869 F. Supp. 2d 320 (E.D.N.Y. 
2012). 
50 R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012). 
51 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VII) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(7) (2012). 
52 See, e.g., R.E., 694 F.3d 167, 191–92 (2d Cir. 2012) (concluding that “the 
[district] may select the specific school without the advice of the parents so long as 
it conforms to the program offered in the IEP”); T.Y. ex rel. T.Y. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t 
of Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3277 (2010) 
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III.   PRIMARY REMEDIES 
The necessary foundation for an IHO remedy consists of 1) a 
ruling of an IDEA violation (e.g., denial of FAPE) based on a 
submitted issue, and 2) a reasonably specific evidentiary basis.53 
Although the remedial authority of IHOs is broad and equitable, 
extending across the full range of declaratory and injunctive relief, 
the two primary remedies for denials of FAPE, in addition to a 
prospective order to develop an appropriately revised IEP, are tuition 
reimbursement and compensatory education.54 
1) For tuition reimbursement, adhere to the flowchart-like multi-
step test that is based on the IDEA and rather extensive case 
law.55 
a) The preliminary equities step concerns timely notice and 
evaluation request/availability.56 
                                                          
(emphasizing that the ruling is “not . . . that school districts have carte blanche to 
assign a child to a school that cannot satisfy the IEP's requirements.  We simply 
hold that an IEP's failure to identify a specific school location will not constitute a 
per se procedural violation of the IDEA”); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION 
DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 10-070, at 13–15 
(2010); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, 
SRO DECISION NO. 07-034, at 13–14 (2007) (noting that the school site need not be 
identified on the IEP, but finding a denial of a FAPE because the district 
nevertheless failed to provide special education services in accordance with the 
IEP). 
53 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Pearson, Civil Action No. 11-2043 (RC), 
2013 WL 485666 (D.D.C. Feb 8, 2013). 
54 See Zirkel, supra note 10. 
55 The outline herein only provides a brief overview.  For a detailed description 
of this multi-step test with supporting case citations illustratively customized to the 
New York jurisdiction, see Perry A. Zirkel, Tuition and Related Reimbursement 
under the IDEA: A Decisional Checklist, 282 EDUC. L REP. 785 (2012).    
56 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)-(iv) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(d)-(e) 
(2012).  See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE 
REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 11-103, at 6–9 (2011); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION 
DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 11-015, at 17–19 
(2011); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, 
SRO DECISION NO. 10-087, at 22–24 (2010); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION 
DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 10-099, at 24–25 
(2010). 
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b) The first appropriateness step concerns whether the district 
provided FAPE,57 thus invoking the “FAPE Standards” 
section of this document.58 
c) The second appropriateness step, which need not be 
addressed if the district provided FAPE, concerns whether 
the parent’s unilateral placement met the substantive 
standard59 in a timely manner.60 
• The same “objective evidence” standard applies.61 
•  LRE is a pertinent but not primary consideration at this 
step.62 
                                                          
57 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2006); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.148(a), 300.148(c) 
(2012). 
58 See supra text accompanying notes 34–52.  The limited exceptions or 
extensions include child find and eligibility cases.  See, e.g., Muller v. Comm. on 
Special Educ., 145 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 1998); Mr. and Mrs. N.C. v. Bedford Cent. 
Sch. Dist., 300 F. App’x 11 (2d Cir. 2008); J.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 
224 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2000); P.C. ex rel. K.C. v. Oceanside Union Free Sch. Dist., 
818 F. Supp. 2d 516 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); Maus v. Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 688 F. 
Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
59 The Supreme Court’s decision in Florence County School District Four v. 
Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993) largely eliminated the procedural standards. 
60 The codification in the IDEA regulations specified this procedural 
requirement and otherwise made clear that an IHO may find the unilateral 
placement was appropriate “even if it does not meet the State standards that apply 
to education provided by the SEA and LEAs.”  34 C.F.R. § 300.148(c) (2012).  For 
the burden of proof at this stage, see supra note 32. 
61 See, e.g., Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 364 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing 
Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998)); NEW 
YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION 
NO. 11-078 (2011); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE 
REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 09-048 (2009); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION 
DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 08-151 (2008); NEW 
YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION 
NO. 08-042 (2008); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE 
REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 04-024 (2004); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION 
DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 01-055 (2001). 
62 See, e.g., Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 
2007); M.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2000); NEW YORK 
STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 
09-033, at 13 (2009).  For examples of LRE contributing to the inappropriateness 
of the private placement, see Schreiber v. E. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 700 F. Supp. 
2d 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Pinn ex rel. Steven P. v. Harrison Cent. Sch. Dist., 473 F. 
Supp. 2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, 
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• The child’s progress at the private placement also is 
relevant,63 but not necessarily determinative.64 
d) The final equities step concerns whether, on balance,65 the 
parents’ other actions were unreasonable.66 
• For applying this step, consider the full balance of the 
equities.67 
• After doing this equitable balancing, provide sufficient 
factual foundation in your written opinion to justify 
granting, reducing, or denying tuition reimbursement.68   
2)  Where the parent has not unilaterally placed the child or at 
least has not sought tuition reimbursement,69 consider ordering 
the alternative retrospective remedy compensatory education.70 
                                                          
OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 08-151, at 12 (2008).  On the other 
hand, for an example where LRE contributed to the appropriateness of the private 
placement, see M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2012). 
63 See, e.g., Matrejek v. Brewster Cent. Sch. Dist., 293 F. App’x 20 (2d Cir. 
2008); Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006).  For the converse, 
where the lack of progress contributed to the conclusion that the private placement 
was inappropriate, see Davis ex rel. C.R. v. Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 772 F. 
Supp. 2d 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 431 F. App’x 12 (2d Cir. 2011). 
64 Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 115 (explaining that benefits may not be targeted 
specifically to the child’s disability-related needs).   
65 See, e.g., J.S. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 826 F. Supp. 2d 635 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Gabel ex rel. L.G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 
368 F. Supp. 2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  
66 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(III) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(d)(3) 
(2012). 
67 See, e.g., S.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 646 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, 
SRO DECISION NO. 12-001, at 19–21 (2012); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION 
DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 11-131, at 10–12 
(2011); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, 
SRO DECISION NO. 11-056, at 13–16 (2011). 
68 See, e.g., Wolfe v. Taconic-Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 167 F. Supp. 2d 530 
(N.D.N.Y. 2001); see also Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist. v. V.P. ex rel. G.P., 373 F. 
Supp. 2d 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d mem., 192 F. App’x 62 (2d Cir. 2006); Loren 
F. ex rel. Fisher v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 349 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2003).     
69 In the only published federal appellate case to date, the Third Circuit ruled 
that compensatory education is not available for a unilaterally placed private school 
student.  P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  
    
258 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 33-1 
a) As the threshold, the majority of jurisdictions require a 
denial of FAPE, whereas in New York it is not well 
settled71 whether the denial must be gross as a general 
matter or only for denials of FAPE after age 21.72 
b)  An even more open question is whether the applicable 
approach for calculation in New York is quantitative or 
qualitative.73  
• At least for the qualitative approach, you should not 
delegate to the IEP team your authority for calculating the 
                                                          
70 For a synthesis of the pertinent case law on a national basis, see, e.g., Perry 
A. Zirkel, Compensatory Education under the IDEA: An Annotated Update of the 
Law, 251 EDUC. L. REP. 501 (2010).  For the relationship to tuition reimbursement 
and an analysis of the quantitative approach, see Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory 
Education Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: The Third 
Circuit’s Partially Mis-Leading Position, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 879 (2006).   
71 See, e.g., Student X v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 51 IDELR ¶ 122 (E.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
72 Compare French v. New York State Dep’t of Educ., 476 F. App’x 468, 470, 
471 (2d Cir. 2011); P. ex rel. Mr. and Mrs. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 
111 (2d Cir. 2008) (implying that this standard only applies after age 21), with J.A. 
v. E. Ramapo Sch. Dist., 603 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (suggesting that this 
standard applies generally).  The state review officer’s decisions that distinguished 
“added services” (for students who have not reached age 21 or graduation) from 
compensatory education indirectly have limited the gross violation cases to these 
ex-students.  See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF 
STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 09-056 (2009) (noting a gross violation 
standard when the student had graduated); NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION 
DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 02-019 (2002).  The 
courts have continued to use the term compensatory education generically without 
addressing the “added services” distinction and without decisively resolving the 
scope and standards for gross violations.  See, e.g., Student X v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of 
Educ., 51 IDELR ¶ 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
73 Without specifically addressing the question, the Second Circuit in P. v. 
Newington Board of Education arguably supported the qualitative approach by 
affirming the IHO’s flexible form of compensatory education, with citations to 
decisions from other jurisdictions that use the qualitative approach.  See P. ex rel. 
Mr. and Mrs. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2008).  Yet in a 
subsequent unpublished decision, the trial court applied a quantitative approach.  
Student X v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 51 IDELR ¶ 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).  For an 
explanatory comparison, with the applicable case law from other jurisdictions, 
between the quantitative and qualitative approaches, see Perry A. Zirkel, The Two 
Competing Approaches for Calculating Compensatory Education Under the IDEA, 
257 EDUC. L. REP. 550 (2010). 
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compensatory education award, such as whether or when 
to reduce or terminate it.74 
c) In New York (which follows the majority approach), the 
equities, including the extent to which parental actions have 
been unreasonable, apply to compensatory education 
cases.75 
d) As with remedial relief under the IDEA more generally, 
IHOs should provide sufficient factual foundation for the 
basis and calculus of the compensatory education award.76 
e) Similarly applicable, more generally, make sure that the 
order for this relief is reasonably specific and clear; courts 
                                                          
74 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Fayette County, Ky. v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307, 318 
(6th Cir. 2007); Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 526 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005).  
75 See, e.g., French ex rel. French v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 476 F. App’x 468 
(2d Cir. 2011); see also Garcia v. Bd. of Educ., 520 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2008); 
NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO 
DECISION NO. 11-096, at 10, 19 (2011) (upholding the portion of an IHO decision 
that denied compensatory education services due to the parents’ failure to 
cooperate with the district). 
76 See, e.g., Streck v. Bd. of Educ., 280 F. App’x 66 (2d Cir. 2008); Walker v. 
District of Columbia, 786 F. Supp. 2d 232 (D.D.C 2011); Stanton ex rel. K.T. v. 
District of Columbia, 680 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D.D.C. 2010); B.T. ex rel. Mary T. v. 
Dep’t of Educ., 676 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Haw. 2010); Mr. and Mrs. C v. Maine 
Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 6, 49 IDELR ¶ 36 (D. Me. 2007); Dep’t of Educ. v. L.K., 46 
IDELR ¶ 36 (D. Haw. July 10, 2006).  But cf. Cousins v. District of Columbia, No. 
011–172 (AK), 2012 WL 1439033 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 2012); G.D. ex rel. G.D. v. 
Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 832 F. Supp. 2d 455 (E.D. Pa. 2011); T.G. ex rel. T.G. v. 
Midland Sch. Dist. 7, 848 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (ruling that the calculus 
need not be exacting where reasonably justified).  To avoid such problems, a 
federal court recently warned that “[the IHO decision] must provide a detailed 
explanation as to why or why not compensatory education is warranted and his 
reasons for developing a particular compensatory program.”  B.T. ex rel. Mary T. 
v. Dep’t of Educ., 676 F. Supp. 2d 982, 990. (D. Haw. 2009).  For examples of 
second tier review, see NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF 
STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 11-132, at 18–24 (2011) (denying a request to 
increase the quantity of compensatory or make-up services that the IHO awarded); 
NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO 
DECISION NO. 03-075 (2003) (finding a miscalculation in the amount of services 
that the IHO awarded); see also NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, 
OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION NO. 11-121, at 14–22 (2011); NEW 
YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF STATE REVIEW, SRO DECISION 
NO. 10-057, at 8–9 (2010). 
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tend to overturn compensatory education awards that are 
too vague to be enforceable.77 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Appropriate IHO decisions under the IDEA borrow from best 
practices in administrative adjudication more generally but also add 
the specialized features of the IDEA statutory and regulatory 
framework and the extensive case law.  This outline of observations 
and recommendations focuses on these specialized additions, with 
due customization for the variance attributable to differences among 
(1) state special education laws in terms of their added requirements, 
and (2) judicial jurisdictions in terms of their particular 
interpretations. 
                                                          
77 See, e.g., Sch. Bd. of Osceola County v. M.L., 30 IDELR 655 (M.D. Fla. 
1999). 
